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Efforts to integrate regional trade in East
Africa gathered some, albeit weak,
momentum this summer, with the
implementation of the EAC Common Market
(CM) protocol, which aims to harmonise
commercial regulations between Partner
States.  This post documents the events
driving and preventing the progress of
integration.
This summer’s news paints a conflicted picture of integration in
the East African Community. The EAC Common Market
protocol went into effect July 1, with more ongoing clashes
than fanfare. Observers and policymakers alike remarked on
the persistence of non-tariff barriers, while local producers and
their representatives worry over how trade disruptions will
affect incomes and local revenue.
Reviving momentum through infrastructure…
Yet signs of progress remained highly visible: local press
reported plans to launch One-Stop-Border-Posts between Kenya
and Tanzania (Holili-Taveta), Kenya and Uganda (Busia-
Malaba), and Burundi and Rwanda (Kanyaru-Akanyaru). In
July, observers saw over $200 million dedicated to massive
highway improvements linking Mombasa port to Tanzania. 
July saw proposals for a joint railway project being pitched by
Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania; the proposal aims to raise
over $7 billion for lines interlinking the three markets. The
public also received some encouraging soundbites in August
from the EAC’s respective governments on energy projects and
infrastructure for oil exports.
Energetically optimistic reports with catchphrases like, “fast-
tracking development” and “unlocking East Africa’s potential,”
echo a widely broadcasted, and by no means unwarranted,
hope that improving internal transport infrastructure will
facilitate the exploitation of gains from additional trade. This
includes the recently renewed and extended Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act. American President Obama’s visit to the
region also reinforced the accepted belief that “It shouldn’t be
harder for African countries to trade with each other than it is
[…] to trade with Europe and America.”
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But the spirit is not moving us
Less encouraging has been the trade disputes over sugar and
rice, as the region’s less efficient members adjust to competition
with a common market. For example, Tanzania had initially
been granted a zero percent duty for rice imports due to its high
domestic prices. June saw it first threatened then punished with
the imposition of the EAC 75% duty on its rice exports to
Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya, following charges that its traders
were blending local rice with Asian imports. Tanzanian officials
called on its traders to follow EAC guidelines, reasoning that
foreign rice in Tanzanian markets was falsely imported under
the pretence of transhipment to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
EAC sugar trade had a more amicable start in July, with
Tanzania and Rwanda being granted permission to import
sugar “from partner states that have excess production,” using
the CM protocol’s “stay of application” provision which allows
member states to temporarily deviate from the common
external tariff’s Sensitive Item duty (see Figure 1).  Under the
stay of application, Tanzania and Rwanda can apply duties
below 100% (50% for three months and 25% for twelve
months, respectively) to imported sugar.  In a perfect world,
these limits, combined with adequate enforcement of rules of
origin (RoO), should prevent traders from exporting local sugar
mixed with imports.
Figure 1: EAC Sensitive Item List
However, deals affecting levels of protection have historically
been associated with subsequent accusations of export dumping
into partner markets, as was the case in the EAC’s other big
summer news event.  August saw a controversial bilateral deal
between Presidents Museveni and Kenyatta to reopen the
Kenyan market to Ugandan sugar and the Ugandan market to
Kenyan beef.
The deal resolved Uganda’s nearly twenty year import ban of
Kenyan beef due to unsettled concerns about mad cow disease. 
Kenya, meanwhile, had been blocking Ugandan sugar imports
since 2012, when it accused Ugandan traders of exporting
cheap imports to Kenya and thus required them to carry
permits.  (Of special note is that these imports were duty free,
under a prior deal brokered in order to help Uganda fill a
domestic shortage.) The permit requirement prompted Uganda’s
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domestic shortage.) The permit requirement prompted Uganda’s
retaliatory accusation of a Kenyan non-tariff barrier.  While the
dispute’s resolution is a step forward, the political backlash in
Kenya demonstrates how difficult removing protection can be.
Slow and complex, not short and sweet
While the summer’s celebrated infrastructure investments signal
commitments to integration, the rice and sugar controversies
highlight the challenge policy-makers face in simultaneously
adhering to EAC regulatory obligations while improving the
competitiveness of domestic production.  Of obvious priority is
the need to better monitor and enforce EAC rules of origin. 
This is reflected in a comment by the secretary general of
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD): “If there was an efficient and properly working
customs union authority there would be no notion of exporting
from Uganda to Kenya because you would not call that
exporting.”
Consistently identifying domestic production can help address a
second issue blunting the spirit of regional free trade: EAC
states’ repeated reliance on extra-EAC suppliers to meet
domestic production gaps.  The real test of progress for the
region is whether its leadership can foster a regionally-focused
mind-set and promote norms that consistently forward EAC
priorities, notwithstanding the ultimate beneficiaries’ national
origin. This challenge is currently exemplified by Pakistan’s
request to Kenya to lower its import duty on rice.
Finally, while inconsistent customs practices disrupt market
integration, broad similarities in the region’s principal products
—like rice and sugar—create competitive frictions that run
against harmonisation efforts. Regional integration is thus a
politically complicated process to implement, given persistent
incentives to protect local groups. Ideally, the EAC will gain
competitiveness as a block and benefit from improved
economies of scale and access to regional and international
markets.  However, should they fail to harmonise processes and
uniformly apply rules, the EAC members risk a zero sum
situation and further delays.
